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Abstract 
The English trust form has been an invaluable tool in the growth and development of 
capital markets, assisting in the smooth running of the bond markets in a way which 
is seemingly unattainable through contract law alone. During the course of the last 
few years, however, modern western finance has begun to experiment with, and 
embrace, a new legal instrument: the Islamic Sukuk.  
Similar to bonds in their employment of the trust form, the sukuk is growing to 
be an essential tool in modern finance, providing western business with an 
opportunity to tap a previously restricted source of funding. Since the introduction of 
the instrument its’ use has continued to grow, with many city law firms now having 
specialist Islamic Finance teams to tackle the unique questions and hurdles that the 
integration of sukuk into the western financial system inevitably creates. 
This article examines the use of the trust form by both traditional bonds, and 
the Islamic sukuk, to ascertain why the trust is so valuable, and begins to assess 
what advantages and disadvantages may arise from the more common use of the 
sukuk in our western financial system. 
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Introduction  
On 25th June 2014, the first sovereign sukuk1  in the western world was issued by 
the UK government, marking out the United Kingdom as a key player in the future of 
Islamic finance. Unlike traditional bonds, in which the appointment of a trustee is 
optional, key differences in the fundamentals of sukuk mean that all sukuk 
arrangements involve the use of trusts and trustees. In this dissertation, I will look 
into how the trust form has been manipulated to assist in the operation of capital 
markets, specifically in the case of bonds, and how this use differs in a typical sukuk 
offering. The trust form has been described as an ‘immensely powerful and flexible 
instrument of modern finance’, 2  and therefore in this dissertation I intend to 
undertake a comparative analysis of the role of trusts in two scenarios: a bond issue, 
and a sukuk issue, in order to record an understanding of why they are employed 
and what the function of the trust actually is in these circumstances. I shall begin with 
an outline of how the bond markets, and sukuk, operate. Following from this I shall 
attempt to explain why the trust instrument is used (and sometimes required) in 
these markets. What are the benefits achieved by the trust which could not be 
granted through, for example, simple contract law? Why are trustees in bond issues 
often the preferred choice over a paying agent, and required by law in the USA? In 
answering these questions, my dissertation will also make comparisons with the 
Islamic sukuk to assess what advantages or disadvantages, if any, arise from using 
this alternative legal form. 
The answer to these questions, I suggest, is threefold. The trust instruments’ 
asset partitioning function allows for bond monies to be held separate from the funds 
of the issuer or the trustee; the trust instrument allows for a level of organisation and 
                                                        
1
 Commonly translated as ‘Islamic Bonds’ though this is not a strictly accurate comparison, sukuks 
are in essence sharia-compliant bond certificates. 
2
 Roy Goode, Commercial Law (3
rd
 Edn, Penguin 2004). 
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accountability which could not be achieved through pure contract law, with benefits 
to both the issuer and the bondholders most notably with regards to acceleration of 
the bond; and finally the appointment of a trustee allows for a degree of efficiency 
which would be harder to attain through other means.  In order to carry out such an 
analysis, it is first necessary to provide an understanding of how the conventional 
bond market operates, and the place of sukuks within the UK capital markets. 
 
The Fundamental of the International Bond Market  
A conventional bond is a debt instrument which promises to pay the bearer periodic 
interest3 in return for an immediate loan, until such time as the loan sum is repaid.4 
Bonds have four categories of issuer (the borrower): Sovereign governments, local 
governments, supranational bodies such as the World Bank, and corporations.5 A 
bond will always include a ‘term to maturity’, typically between two and thirty years,6 
at which time the principal sum is repaid. Included in a bond can be what are known 
as ‘embedded options’. Examples of these include a call feature, through which the 
issuer can bring forward the date of maturity, a put feature, through which the 
bondholder can bring forward maturity, or a convertible bond agreement, through 
which the bondholder may exchange the bond for a specified amount of equity 
(shares) in the issuing company.7  For the purposes of this dissertation it is not 
necessary to explain further the rationale behind these embeddable options. Also of 
                                                        
3
 The amount will either be set as the ‘coupon rate’ (traditionally the bond paper had coupons which 
could be torn off and exchanged for the interest), or alternatively in the case of a ‘floating-rate note’ 
(FRN) which are typically linked to six-month LIBOR and therefore the rates are reset every six 
months.  
4
 Philip Coggan, The Money Machine: How the City Works, (7
th
 Edn, Penguin 2015). 
5
 M. Choudhry, An Introduction to Bond Markets, (4
th
 Edn, Wiley 2010). 
6
 Op cit fn 4. 
7
 Op cit fn 5. 
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note bonds are ‘bearer certificates’ and can be traded on secondary markets once 
issued.8 
Participants in the bond markets can be grouped into four categories: Short-
term institutional investors; 9  long-term institutional investors; 10  mixed-horizon 
institutional investors;11  and market professionals.12 ; 13  Key players involved in a 
typical bond issuing, are the issuer/debtor, the bond-holder/investor, the managers 
and, when instructed, the trustee. Fig. 1, below, sets out the structure of a typical 
bond issue, and all of these places shall be filled at the ‘pre-launch’ stage of the 
issue i.e. before the bond issue has been publicly announced.14 The issuer shall 
directly instruct a trustee, and mandate a ‘lead manager’ who shall manage the bond 
issue and will often be a financial institution such as an investment bank. Both the 
issuer and lead manager shall then instruct their lawyers and the necessary 
documents shall be drawn up, usually by the lead manager’s lawyers. These include 
the prospectus,15 subscription agreement16 and trust deed,17 among others. The lead 
manager may also approach further financial institutions to act as additional 
managers. These players together agree to form a syndicate which shall typically 
underwrite the bond issue, and buy any unsold bonds to subsequently sell on to 
                                                        
8
 Ibid. 
9
 For example: banks, treasury desks, and central banks. 
10
 For example: pension funds. 
11
 Most corporates will fall under this category, and as such this category is also very active in the 
primary market i.e. issuing bonds of their own to fund their business. 
12
 This category includes investment banks and bond traders. 
13
 Op cit fn 5. 
14
 This is called the ‘launch and roadshow’ stage, at which point the bond issue is marketed to 
possible investors. Following from this is the ‘issue’ stage, where the subscription agreement and trust 
deed are signed, the bond instrument is created, and the investors receive the bonds in return for the 
purchase price.  
15
 A document which contains all of the information about the bond and the issuing corporation in 
order for investors to make a decision. The prospectus is governed by Part VI of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000, and the Financial Conduct Authority Prospectus Rules, located in the 
FCA Handbook (<www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/PR/> accessed 19 April 2016). 
16
 Signed by the issuer and the managers, in which the managers agree to purchase the bonds. 
17
  The trust deed gives legal form to the bonds and appoints the trustee to act for the bondholders 
and represent their interests. 
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investors. In the UK, a trustee is optional, however in the US jurisdiction a trustee 
has been mandatory since 1939,18 and in sukuk offerings they are a necessary 
participant. 
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of a Bond Issue 
Source: Practical Law (Thompson Reuters) 
 
 
                                                        
18
 Following the passing of the Trust Indenture Act 1939. 
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I shall be focusing in this dissertation on the international bond markets, which 
consists of bonds and Eurobonds, which are bonds produced in a different currency 
from that of the country in which they are issued.19 The role of the trustee in such 
bond issuings is to look after the interests of the bond-holder, typically by fulfilment of 
three functions: (i) the payment function i.e. passing on interest and principal 
payments to the bondholders; (ii) the monitoring function, which involves using their 
available resources and requesting the necessary disclosure of information and 
cooperation from the issuer to make sure that all of the issuer’s obligations are being 
fulfilled; and (iii) the representative action function, which includes agreeing to 
modifications and waivers of bond provisions, and enforcement of the provisions, for 
example through acceleration (making the bonds immediately payable).  
In recent years, however, the representative action function has become more 
and more difficult. The Elektrim litigation20 of 2004-2005, for example, did not make 
clear when the courts may choose to intervene following the action of the trustee, 
arguably paving the way for overly cautious trusteeship, and the rise of investor 
activism in the case of junk bonds has muddied the waters somewhat. Further to 
this, it is interesting to see that in the case of Islamic sukuk offerings, the trustee is 
often the issuer themselves, which raises questions as to the obligations owed by 
the trustee in such situations, and how the role differs between the two structures. 
There is no reason why the sukuk trustee is essentially the issuer, and so this 
                                                        
19
 The reason behind the name being that non-US borrowers still wanted to raise US capital (USD) 
following the imposition of the Interest Equalization Tax imposed by President Kennedy in 1963 to 
counter the US current-account deficit. As such, bankers – predominately in London – begun to sell 
USD-denominated bonds in European countries. In short, a Eurobond is a bond sold outside of the 
denominating currency. See P. Coggan op cit fn 4. 
20
 Concord Trust v Law Debenture Trust Corporation Plc. [2004] EWHC 1216 (Ch); [2004] EWCA Civ 
1001; [2005] UKHL 27 
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dissertation intends to look at possible benefits and challenges faced by each form of 
trustee. 
 
The Fundamentals of Sukuks 
A sukuk, put simply, is a Shari’ah compliant alternative to a bond. The Accounting 
and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) has recognised 
14 types of sukuk21, however the most commonly used is the al-ijara structure due to 
its ‘…uncontested Shari’ah-compliance and investors’ familiarity with the sale and 
leaseback structure.’22 As such, I shall be focusing on the al-ijara structure in this 
dissertation. The AAOIFI is a not-for-profit organisation founded in Bahrain in the 
1990s and they produce sets of standards for the global Islamic finance industry. 
Compliance with AAOIFI’s Shari’ah standards is mandatory in Bahrain, Oman, 
Pakistan, Sudan and Syria, and they were the basis for development of national 
guidelines in Indonesia and Malaysia. Further to this, the guidelines have been 
adopted voluntarily by law firms and institutions in the U.K., U.A.E, France and 
others. This clearly illustrates the high regard in which the standards set by the 
organisation are held and their contribution to a harmonization of Shari’ah law and 
interpretation across jurisdictions.  
Islamic law does not allow for certain things which are common features of the 
conventional bond structure, and indeed Western banking in general, and as such 
the use of these structures is strictly prohibited.23 These fundamental principles are 
                                                        
21
 The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions, ‘Shari’ah Standards for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (2015) <http://aaoifi.com/books/shariah-standards-2/?lang=en> 
accessed 30
th
 April 2016. 
22
 Latham and Watkins, ‘The Sukuk Handbook: A Guide To Structuring Sukuk’ (Latham and Watkins, 
2015) <https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/guide-to-structurings-sukuk-2015> accessed 30
th
 April 
2016. 
23
 The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions, ‘Shari’ah Standards for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (2015) Shari’ah Standard 21 <http://aaoifi.com/books/shariah-standards-
2/?lang=en> accessed 30
th
 April 2016. 
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the prohibition of interest (Riba); the prohibition of excess uncertainty (Gharar); and 
the prohibition of support for immoral/unethical activities (Haram). 
Riba 
The charging of interest is known as riba and is prohibited by Islam. This rule has 
been the subject of much discussion in fairly recent history24 with some scholars 
presenting the view that the strict interpretation of the rule is now outdated and not 
relevant in modern society. They argue that the concept of riba is not simply 
‘stipulated excess’, but rather that it is linked to taking advantage of the poor and 
vulnerable. In the old days debtors were the most economically disadvantaged in 
society, with a lack of certainty surrounding their ability to secure their most basic 
needs, and with no protection from the lenders upon whom they relied. Failure to pay 
interest eventually lead to enslavement and slave labour if payments were not kept 
up. The charging of interest in this society was considered unethical, and 
inhumane.25 In today’s society, however, debtors tend to be relatively affluent, have 
secure jobs, and access to financial advice. There are laws protecting against 
exploitation, and the existence of bankruptcy proceedings (also a part of Islamic 
law). People and companies can lose their assets, but nothing more and so it is 
argued that riba in today’s circumstances is not automatically immoral.26  Whilst the 
accepted stance at present is the prohibition of ‘excess in any form’,27 the debate still 
                                                        
24
 Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba and its 
Contemporary Interpretation (2
nd
 Edn, Brill 1999); Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad; M. Kabir Hassan, ‘Riba 
and Islamic Banking’ (2007) 3(1) J.I.E.B.F. 1; Barbara L. Seniawski, ‘Riba Today: Social Equity, the 
Economy, and Doing Business Under Islamic Law’ (2000) 39 Colum.J.Transnat’l.L. 701; Mohammad 
Omar Farooq, ‘Stipulation of Excess in Understanding and Misunderstanding Riba: The Al-Jassas 
Link’ (2007) 21 A.L.Q. 285. 
25
 Abdullah Saeed; ‘The Moral Context of the Prohibition of Riba in Islam Revisited’ (1995) 12(4) 
A.J.I.S.S. 496. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Op cit fn 21. 
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seems to remain open, and interesting questions are raised concerning the future 
development of sukuk should this position change at any time (however unlikely). 
Gharar 
Gharar is a broad concept which has been described as ‘deceit, risk, fraud, 
uncertainty or hazard that might lead to destruction or loss.’28 Gharar is split into two 
types: fahish and yasir. The former is ‘light’ gharar, or risk, which is present in any 
transaction and is permissible. The latter is ‘excess’ gharar which is prohibited, and 
would include the use of a floating interest rate to determine payments, as there is 
no way to know which way and to what extent said interest rates will fluctuate.29 As 
with many other elements of Shari’ah finance law there can be difference of opinion 
among Islamic scholars as to where to draw the line with respect to uncertainty. It 
seems that as with the development of sukuk itself, there is a will amongst all parties 
to facilitate a successful transplanting of Islamic finance into Western jurisdictions.  
Difference of opinion in respect of Islamic financial law more generally has 
been a significant barrier to the emergence and wide use of an Islamic legal system 
in the UK, demonstrated by the cases of Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf 
(Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems NV and ors30 and Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v 
Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd (No.1) 31  in which English law was ruled above 
Shari’ah as the law of enforcement of contracts. In the latter case, Potter LJ 
recognised that Shari’ah law contains ‘areas of considerable controversy and 
difficulty’32 due to the presence of multiple schools of thought, and so it was found 
                                                        
28
 Md Akther Uddin, ‘Principles of Islamic Finance: Prohibition of Riba, Gharar, and Maysir’ (2015) 
MPRA Paper No. 67711 <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67711/1/MPRA_paper_67711.pdf> 
accessed 30
th
 April 2016. 
29
 Muhammad al-Bashir Muhammad al-Amine, Global Sukuk and Islamic Securitization Market: 
Financial Engineering and Product Innovation (Brill 2011). 
30
 [2002] All ER (D) 171 (Feb). 
31
 [2004] EWCA Civ 19. 
32
 Ibid. [55]. 
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that Shari’ah cannot be the host law, in addition to other reasons not relevant to this 
dissertation.  
It can be said, however, that Shari’ah is undergoing a process of 
standardisation in the area of financial law, and that it is beginning to take the shape 
of a coherent legal system. This is thanks in part to institutions such as the AAOIFI 
Shari’ah Standards, and also to organic convergence as Islamic instruments become 
more widely used.33  
Haram 
Haram simply means an activity prohibited by Islamic law. A strict interpretation is 
that immoral and unethical business cannot be supported, for example businesses 
concerned with alcohol, pork, armaments, and gambling, 34  but also any other 
business which is not wholly Shari’ah compliant in all of its operations. 35  This, 
however, would put extreme limitations on companies with which Islamic investment 
banks could do business, and so a group of prominent Islamic scholars have relaxed 
the interpretation somewhat, subject to conditions. For example, if the primary 
business aim is Shari’ah compliant, then this would satisfy the requirement that the 
business as a whole be complaint,36 which would therefore allow investment in a 
hotel which happens to have a bar serving alcohol. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
33
 Nicholas H. D. Foster, ‘Islamic Finance Law as an Emergent Legal System’ (2007) 21 A.L.Q. 170. 
34
 Omar Salah, ‘Islamic Finance: The Impact of the AAOIFI Resolution on Equity-Based Sukuk 
Structures’ (2010) 4(5) Law & Fin.Mkt.Rev. 507.  
35
 Ibid.  
36
 Atif Hanif, ‘Islamic Finance – An Overview’ (2008) 1 Int’l.E.L.Rev. 9. 
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Asset-Backed vs Asset-Based 
In addition to there being many different types of sukuk, they can also be categorised 
as either ‘asset-based’ or ‘asset-backed’, though only a very small percentage fall 
into the latter group.37 The difference between the two stems from the nature of the 
sale of the trust assets, and the nature of the sale raises questions about the 
permissibility of the structure. According to Islam, lawful profit-making must involve 
effort, or at the very least the taking of risk – one cannot profit from an investment 
that they help to finance if they bear no responsibility for its outcome.38  
In an asset-backed sukuk scenario, there is a true sale of assets from the 
obligor to the issuer SPV. There is a full transfer of legal and equitable title and the 
property no longer belongs in any way to the obligor, and therefore there is no debt 
structure. Following the sale, the obligor then acts as servicing agent i.e. they 
perform all tasks in relation to managing and operating the asset(s). In this model, 
return for the investors comes directly from the cash-flow of the securitised asset,39 
and if the asset does not make any money (for example, if the asset was a hotel and 
that hotel suddenly had no guests) then there is no return on the investment. The 
asset-backed model is recognised as truly Shari’ah compliant as there is the 
presence of profit and loss sharing, or risk. There is no guaranteed income stream – 
if the securitised assets are utilised and perform well, then there is profit for the 
investors and the obligor; if it performs badly then the losses are shared. This 
principle is reiterated in the purchase and sale undertakings signed by the parties – 
                                                        
37
 Habib Ahmed, ‘Islamic finance at a crossroads: the dominance of the asset-based sukuk’ (2010) 6 
J.I.B.F.L 366. 
38
 Abdul Karim Abdullah, ‘Asset-Based vs Asset-Backed Sukuk’ (2012) 3(4) I.C.R. 751. 
39
 Razi Pahlavi Abdul Aziz; Anne-Sophie Gintzburger, ‘Equity-Based, Asset-Based and Asset-Backed 
Transactional Structures in Shari’a-Compliant Financing: Reflections on the Current Financial Crisis’ 
(2009) 28(3) Economic Papers 270. 
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in an asset-backed model, the sale/purchase of the asset(s) upon maturity will be for 
the net value of the asset. 
Asset-based sukuk, on the other hand, do not involve a true sale, that is to 
say that there is no transfer of legal title, only the grant of an equitable beneficial 
interest, and the property will remain on the obligors’ books. The fact that there is 
technically the sale of an asset within the structure gives the asset-based model the 
form of a Shari’ah-compliant instrument, but not the substance,40 and it has been 
said that this model maintains ‘the fiction that interest (collected as price mark-up or 
rent, respectively) is in fact a return based on risk associated with the ownership of a 
physical asset.’ 41  The asset-based sukuk very much tries to replicate the 
circumstances of a traditional bond. The risk is removed as returns are not tied to the 
venture or asset(s) themselves, but to the obligations of the obligor. The 
purchase/sale undertakings are drawn up to be for the face value of the sukuk, and 
so any loss following depreciation in value of the asset(s) is to be borne by the 
obligor, and not the investors. The fact that rental amounts are often tied to interest 
rates also raises questions as to the Shari’ah compliance of such structures.42 
Compliance aside, the asset-based sukuk remains to be the far more often 
utilised structure between the two, which raises questions as to the purpose of 
sukuk. Is the instrument being developed to provide a true Shari’ah compliant 
financial tool, or is it simply smoke and mirrors to allow Islamic institutions access to 
prohibited funds? Bill Maurer and Mahmoud A. El-Gamal (fn 38-39) seem to suggest 
the latter, putting forth the position that there is a market of potential buyers who are 
                                                        
40
 Bill Maurer, ‘Form versus substance: AAOIFI projects and Islamic fundamentals in the case of 
sukuk’ (2010) 1(1) J.I.A.B.R. 32. 
41
 Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (Cambridge University 
Press 2006). 
42
 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, ‘Sukuk and their Contemporary Applications’ Chairman of the AAOIFI 
Shari’ah Committee <www.iefpedia.com/english/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Sukuk-and-their-
Contemporary-Applications.pdf> accessed 05 May 2016. 
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interested in the ‘Islamic brand’43 regardless of compliance with AAOIFI Standards 
because they are ‘limited to this type of investment.’ 44  As such, both scholars 
suggest that the AAOIFI has had to soften some of its principles and potentially 
conflict with its understanding of Shari’ah in order to accommodate this new 
market. 45  Given all of the above, this dissertation shall proceed with the more 
common al-ijara asset-based structure in mind. 
Sukuk Al-Ijara 
All sukuk offerings of this nature are based on a prior ijara transaction, which 
grounds the sukuk in assets through a sale and leaseback structure, thus 
circumventing riba. In this scenario the certificate holders are taking pre-determined 
rental payments, not interest. As the rent is a fixed and certain                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
amount, there is also no presence of gharar. Due to the fact that sukuk al-ijara are 
tied to tangible assets46 it is necessary to include a trustee in the structure to hold 
those assets. The reason for this is that whilst a bond is a contractual debt obligation 
with duties and powers held by the trustee, a sukuk is a trust certificate47 – the 
issuing Special Purpose Vehicle holds the trust assets purchased from the obligor 
on trust for the benefit of the certificate holders. The trust must be used in this 
structure as the sukuk certificate holders are not purchasing legal title to the trust 
assets, but rather an equitable, undivided beneficial interest. ‘Where a conventional 
bond is a debt obligation that returns interest to bondholders, a sukuk is – at least in 
                                                        
43
 Op cit fn 40. 
44
 Op cit fn 41. 
45
 Op cit fn 40. 
46
 There are alternative structures e.g. Murabaha, though these sukuk structures are not securitised 
and as such have been ruled inadmissible under Shari’ah law by more conservative Islamic scholars. 
47
 S. R. Vishwanath; Sabahuddin Azmi, ‘An Overview of Islamic Sukuk Bonds’ (2009) (Win) J.S.F. 58. 
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theory – an ownership stake in an underlying asset that provides returns based on 
profit and/or rent.’48 
 
Figure 2: Sukuk al-Ijara Structure 
Source: LexisPSL 
                                                        
48
 Op cit fn 40. 
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As the figure above illustrates, in an asset-based sukuk al ijara structure, the 
SPV is set up by the company seeking funding as a separate, bankruptcy-remote 
company used purely to facilitate the financial arrangement [special purpose] that it 
has been created for, in this case to issue sukuk. The SPV then issues sukuk 
certificates to investors in return for cash (see point 1 of figure 2, above). Following 
from this, on the issue date, the SPV purchases assets from the obligor costing the 
total amount raised from sukuk, and places the assets into trust (point 2, fig.2). The 
obligor signs a purchase undertaking, and the SPV a sale undertaking, to the effect 
that upon maturity or following an early dissolution event such as a default, the 
obligor will re-purchase the assets for a pre-agreed exercise price (the principal 
amount plus any accrued but unpaid profits). The SPV then leases the assets back 
to the obligor for the period until the sukuk reaches maturity (point 3, fig.2), and the 
rental stream acts in the same way as interest payments on traditional bonds – they 
go to the trustee SPV who then passes them to the investors as periodic distribution 
amounts (point 4, fig.2). Upon maturity of the sukuk, the undertakings are enforced 
and the assets sold back to the obligor for the exercise price (point 5, fig.2), and the 
dissolution amount i.e. the principal is paid to the investors (point 6, fig.2). During the 
lifetime of the sukuk, the obligor will be appointed as servicing agent, which means 
that they manage and operate the trust assets. 
In the case of sukuk al-ijara, the SPV acts as both issuer and trustee for the 
sukuk certificate. This raises questions as to whose interests the trustee would be 
acting in the case of a default, when conventionally it is supposed to be against the 
issuer and in favour of the investors. One way of getting around this, which appears 
to be general practice, is for the trustee SPV to delegate its’ powers to an 
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independent trust management company, at least in the event of an early 
dissolution. Essentially, however, a sukuk and bond offering are very similar. Just as 
an investor in bonds isn’t so interested in what the bond issuer does, the sukuk 
investor is not interested in the assets grounding the sukuk. What interests the 
investors is how creditworthy the issuer is, and when they will see a return on their 
investment.  
 
Bond Trusts, Sukuk Trusts and the Asset Partitioning Function  
Organisational law involves the arrangement and active structuring of the rights of 
various creditors in such a way that certain groups have recourse to certain assets,49 
achieved through the partitioning of those assets as mentioned above. It also allows 
for the shielding of certain assets from certain other groups in the event of insolvency 
which makes lending and financing much more attractive. In their article on the 
functions of trust law50 Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei advance the suggestion 
that perhaps the primary function of trust law which makes it such a useful tool in 
comparison with, for example, contract law, is the asset partitioning ability of the trust 
instrument. By this, Hansmann and Mattei mean that trusts allow for assets to be 
placed ‘… into bundles that can conveniently be pledged separately to different 
classes of creditors.’51  Furthermore, they speak of the ability to shield the trust 
assets from the personal creditors of the trustee, a vital function for trusts in general 
and of specific use in the bond and sukuk scenario.  
 
                                                        
49
 Henry Hansmann; Reinier Kraakman, ‘Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning’ (2000) 44 
European Economic Review 807. 
50
 Henry Hansmann; Ugo Mattei, ‘The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic 
Analysis’ (1998) 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 434. 
51
 Ibid. 
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Asset Partitioning in Bond Trusts 
When a bond is issued, and a trustee appointed, there are two things that are held 
on trust for the bondholders: any moneys received by the trustee in respect of the 
bonds, and the benefit of the company’s covenant to pay interest and the principal 
amount. If, however, the bond is a secured bond then the assets offered up as 
security will also be held on trust.  
Considering that the vast majority of international bonds are unsecured,52 with 
conventional unsecured bonds, all that is being held is an authority to exercise 
powers on behalf of the bondholders,53 and so the asset partitioning function is not in 
use so much initially. However, in the event of a default, the trustee has the authority 
to accelerate payment in which case the bonds become immediately payable either 
directly to the bondholders, or to the trustee, in which case those funds are then no 
longer in the hands of the company, and so partitioned and organised in such a way 
that they have been ‘reserved’ to pay the creditor bondholders.  
 
Asset Partitioning in Sukuk Trusts 
Similarly to conventional bonds, when sukuk is issued, monies received by the 
issuer/trustee in the form of rentals are held on trust for the certificate holders. The 
difference is that instead of just the benefit of a covenant being held, the issuer of 
sukuk also holds the trust assets (bought from and then leased back to the obligor) 
for the benefit of the certificate holders. The trust in sukuk scenarios is therefore 
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essential in order to create an ‘undivided, pro rata interest’ 54  in the assets 
represented by the sukuk.  
The reason for this is that the certificate holders are not purchasing the trust 
property per se, but rather an interest in that property i.e. the rental proceeds for a 
specified time until maturity. Just like with a traditional bond, they have bought a right 
to receive payment from the issuing company/SPV. The organisational aspect of the 
trust is arguably more relevant in the sukuk scenario, as in these cases there is 
tangible property being held on trust by the bankruptcy-remote SPV and is therefore 
placed out of the hands of the company’s other creditors. Due to the novelty of sukuk 
in Western jurisdictions, it remains to be seen how the addition of tangible partitioned 
property would impact on insolvency and default scenarios. In asset-based sukuk, 
for example, al ijara structures, there is no ‘true sale’ of the security assets as 
explained above. They remain on the books of the obligor and the investors merely 
have an equitable interest in the property, and so it is commonly accepted that there 
is no option for recourse to the trust property in the event of default.55 Regarding 
asset-backed sukuk, however, there is a true sale and passing of legal title of the 
trust property, and so in theory the investors could seek recourse to the trust 
property in the event of default, although there is uncertainty surrounding this 
possibility.56 
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The Trust, Governance and Accountability 
In the United Kingdom jurisdiction, whilst they are commonly employed there is no 
mandatory requirement for the appointment of a trustee in a bond issue. Conversely, 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) decided in 1939 that 
the interests of the public and investors are adversely affected without the presence 
of a fully informed trustee, with adequate powers, responsibilities and resources.57  
Following the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and subsequent Great Depression, 
the United States government was keen to intervene in and regulate the markets to 
put an end to the near total freedom of market actors. 58  Prior to the crash, 
companies had been exaggerating the value of the securities that they were issuing, 
and brokers were selling these to investors with promises of huge returns – promises 
based on little to no information about the companies, or which were ‘wholly 
fraudulent’.59 To do this, two pieces of legislation were enacted: The Securities Act of 
1933 which regulated primary security issues, and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 which regulated brokers and exchanges i.e. the secondary market. The latter 
also created the SEC60 - an independent, cross-party regulatory authority which was 
to report each year on matters determined the year prior. Areas included changes in 
Commission regulations which would benefit investors,61 problems which investors 
had with financial service providers and investment products,62 and the impact on 
investors of proposed rules and regulations.63 The SEC’s annual reports led to the 
passing of a number of statutes including Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 
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1935; the Trust Indenture Act of 1939; the Investment Company Act of 1940; and the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, which together gave minimum protections to 
investors to prevent a repeat of 1929.64 It is therefore no surprise that the SEC and 
the Trust Indenture Act (TIA), both borne from a financial crisis, should come under 
scrutiny following the 2008 market crash.65  
The Commission decided to include the indenture trustee into their study of 
reorganisation and protective committees as the ‘… broad discretionary powers’ of 
the indenture trustee are utilised more frequently when a reorganisation is taking 
place, and also because they have a direct bearing on the need to form protective 
committees.66; 67 They outlined in their report major concerns surrounding indenture 
trusts, documenting misappropriation of profits, insufficient income streams and 
gross misinterpretations.68 The Commission also found that although the trustees 
had these broad powers they weren’t offering protection to the security holders. 
Decisions were made with no consultation, and there was apparent ‘… injury to 
thousands of investors’ 69  who held securities with no real way of monitoring, 
controlling or enforcing the performance of the issuer. Additionally, there were 
concerns surrounding insider control of bond issuances.70 As such, the federal TIA 
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was passed which makes appointment of a trustee mandatory, and stipulates certain 
duties and powers which they possess.71  
The benefits of having a trustee operating in either of these situations are 
clear on the part of the bondholders. The trustee has been described as a ‘… 
representative of the [bond]holders, [who] owes its duties to them’.72 The trustee in 
theory has the time, resources and power to monitor the issuer and their compliance 
with all of the covenants in the trust deed, to flag up and look into any causes for 
concern, and to take action if need be.73 This resonates with the thinking behind the 
SEC’s recommendations to transform the indenture trustees ‘… into active trustees 
with the obligation to exercise that degree of care and diligence which the law 
attaches to such high fiduciary position.’74 However, much has been written about 
the true nature of the indenture trustee and to what extent they really serve the 
interests of bondholders. 
 
The Pre-Default Role of the Trust 
It is a well-known principle in English law that one aspect of the fiduciary relationship 
between a trustee and the beneficiary is that there can be no conflict of interest 
present.75 This rule is upheld in the law of English bond trusts; however, the U.S. 
takes a different stance which speaks volumes about the perception of the role of the 
trustee pre-default. The Trust Indenture Reform Act of 1990 states that part of sec. 
310(b) of the former legislation (which regards disqualification of a trustee by reason 
of conflicting interest) is to be amended to read: 
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“For the purposes of this subsection, an indenture trustee shall be 
deemed to have a conflicting interest if the indenture securities are in 
default (as such term is defined in such indenture, but exclusive of any 
period of grace or requirement of notice) and…”76 
 
This passage from the legislation clearly shows that there is a view that the 
trustee’s role is not really engaged prior to a default scenario, however this is not a 
universally adopted point of view with arguments existing to the effect that there is 
actually a substantial pre-default role to be carried out. 
To give an example, one often overlooked area is the negotiation stage of the 
indenture. The reason for the oversight could be down to the fact that at this stage 
the bonds have yet to be issued and the issuer has appointed the trustee, and 
therefore the trustee acts with a feeling of ‘indifference’ prior to the investors 
becoming actual individuals.77 This raises concerns with the governance of the bond 
as it could mean that only very minimal protections for bondholders are incorporated 
into the bond at the negotiation stage which could lead to problems later down the 
line. Another problem in this area is that the issuer will usually appoint the trustee 
rather close to the closing date for the bond which leaves them with little time to 
negotiate aspects of the relevant documents. 
Take, for example, the case of Citibank NA v MBIA Assurance SA and Ors78 
in which Citibank was the trustee for a series of noteholders of varying classes 
issued by a company (FLF). Some of the notes were guaranteed by a third party, 
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MBIA Assurance, and it was written into the trust deed that MBIA could give 
directions to Citibank, and that they could exercise a large degree of control over 
many trustee duties and discretions. Upon restructuring, the noteholders for a certain 
class of debt were given the option to either redeem their notes as shares in a 
Eurotunnel company plus cash, or the option for just cash. MBIA directed Citibank to 
accept the cash option, but QVT, the holder of notes not guaranteed by MBIA, asked 
Citibank not to accept this direction. It was affirmed in court that, given the wording of 
the trust deed, Citibank had to comply with MBIA.79 If the role of the trustee is to 
always act in the best interests of the bondholders, should Citibank have drawn 
attention to the provisions relevant to this case in the negotiation stage? Whilst there 
was no liability in this case on the part of Citibank, who acted in good faith and in 
accordance with the trust deed, this case does raise questions regarding the duties 
of trustees in these early stages. 
In a sukuk scenario, I would suggest that such a case would never have 
arisen in the first place. The sukuk form requires that all sukuk holders have an 
undivided interest in the trust, in other words, there cannot be ‘classes’ of certificate 
holders as is a possibility with conventional bonds. This structure goes some way to 
preventing one class of holder pressuring, or overriding through provisions in the 
deed, the trustee to force action which would be beneficial to that class at the 
expense of the others. On the other hand, in a sukuk scenario the issuing company 
is the trustee, though the market practice is to delegate this power out as explained 
in the section above.  
Whilst this delegation solves any problems faced following the issue date, the 
same concerns with regards to bondholder protection during the negotiation stage 
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come into play as with conventional bonds. Furthermore, specifically regarding 
protection in the United States, it is unlikely that the courts would find the TIA to 
apply to sukuk. According to the Act: 
 
(7) The term ‘‘indenture’’ means any mortgage, deed of trust, trust or 
other indenture, or similar instrument or agreement (including any 
supplement or amendment to any of the foregoing), under which 
securities are outstanding or are to be issued, whether or not any 
property, real or personal, is, or is to be, pledged, mortgaged, 
assigned, or conveyed thereunder.80 
 
Due to the fact that a sukuk certificate technically represents an interest in an 
asset rather than a right to receive interest, regardless of the practical uses of the 
structure, it is questionable as to whether sukuk would come under the Act. If not, 
then not even the bondholder protections protected by the statute are guaranteed. 
Though unable to say with certainty until such a case involving sukuk reaches the 
courts of either the United Kingdom or United States of America, one possible 
consequence of the issues above could be sweeping and all-encompassing 
exclusion clauses to limit the liability of the trustee of the sukuk. As before, there is 
current U.K. legislation to mitigate the effects of trustee exemption clauses for 
conventional bonds,81 however whether this would stretch to include sukuk remains 
to be seen, potentially leaving open the ability to weaken the position of sukuk-
holders. 
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The Post-Default Role of the Trustee  
Whilst I have highlighted in the previous section that the trustee still has to perform a 
more than trivial role before the circumstances of a default, it goes without question 
that the post-default duties of the trustee are far more substantial and require a lot 
more care and skill in both bond and sukuk scenarios. In the case of sukuk, the 
change in who carries out the trustee duties in a default scenario is testament to this 
shift in the nature of the role. Efficient governance, the mechanisms of which allow 
for efficient decision-making,82 is the key to an effective trusteeship.  
 
Seeking No Direction from Bondholders 
In this regard, one of the benefits of the presence of a trust and a trustee, for both 
the issuer and the bondholders, is that it can prevent the problem described as the 
‘mad bond-holder’83 The mad bondholder is the single noteholder who could, in 
circumstances of a technical default, accelerate the bond regardless of whether or 
not it made commercial sense to do so. On the flip side of the coin, the trustee now 
faces a dilemma – on the one hand they have a duty to the investors to maximise 
their returns in the event of a default, 84  which may mean not acting on some 
technical defaults. On the other hand, they are a representative of the bondholders, 
and while under no obligation to seek their advice before acting the trustee will be 
aware of possibly incursions of liability due to the risk involved in either taking or 
refraining from action should the move fail to bring about the intended effect on 
return.  
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Writing from a U.S. perspective, Schwartz and Sergi85 list a number of potential 
decisions to be taken by trustees in the event of a default other than that of non-
payment.86 They include determining whether or not to involve the bondholders in 
the first place; obtaining collateral to secure unsecured bonds; enforcement of 
remedies such as acceleration; suing for overdue payments; and the best course of 
action if the issuer begins insolvency proceedings. These decisions are not specific 
to the U.S., or to bonds – they also apply to the U.K. and to sukuk. The difference is 
in the standard of care which must be adhered to in the making of such decisions. 
 
In the United States, the TIA states that: 
(c) The indenture trustee shall exercise in case of default (as such term 
is defined in such indenture) such of the rights and powers vested in it 
by such indenture, and to use the same degree of care and skill in their 
exercise, as a prudent man would exercise or use under the 
circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs.87 
 
Whereas in the U.K., the wording is such that: 
(1) Whenever the duty under this subsection applies to a trustee, he 
must exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in the 
circumstances, having regard in particular— 
(a) to any special knowledge or experience that he has or holds himself 
out as having, and 
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(b) if he acts as trustee in the course of a business or profession, to 
any special knowledge or experience that it is reasonable to expect of 
a person acting in the course of that kind of business or profession.88 
 
There is clearly a difference in the way in which these two provisions have 
been worded, and there is a degree of consensus among scholars that the U.S. 
construction of the duty of care makes for cautious and ineffective trustee89 who will 
always seek the direction of bondholders ‘for any unilateral action by the indenture 
trustee that entails a degree of risk.’90 As with the section above, the American 
legislation is aimed specifically at indenture trusts and so it is not certain whether or 
not the provisions are transferable to sukuk. However, the U.K. legislation applies to 
trustees in general when performing their duties, and so would apply to a sukuk 
trustee, thus making the position in the U.K. clearer in terms of integrating the 
Islamic instrument into a western financial and legal system.  
In order to solve the issues that arise regarding efficiency of bond 
governance, Schwartz and Sergi propose the adoption of a ‘business judgement 
rule’ into trust provisions which would allow for a greater degree of risk to be taken 
by the trustee without a fear of liability, as there would be a general presumption 
against such liability. 91  Under such a rule (which already applies to corporate 
directors in the U.S.), the trustee’s actions would only be examined to the level 
required to determine the existence of an independent business decision, made in 
                                                        
88
 Trustee Act 2000, s1. 
89
 Mayo Adams Shattuck, ‘The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the 
United States in the Twentieth Century’ (1951) 12(4) Ohio St.L.J. 491; Henry F. Johnson, ‘The 
'Forgotten' Securities Statute: Problems in the Trust Indenture Act’ (1981) 13 U.Tol.L.Rev 92; Jeffrey 
N. Gordon, ‘The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule’ (1987) 67 N.Y.U.L.Rev 
52. 
90
 Op cit fn 84. 
91
 Ibid. 
KENT STUDENT LAW REVIEW Volume 3 2017 
28 
 
good faith and without any abuse of discretion. 92  The rule makes sense in a 
business context where the role of the trustee is not simply to preserve the value of 
the trust for the beneficiaries, as with traditional trusts, but to maximise it. A balance 
needs to be struck between acting with care and skill, and maintaining good 
governance of the bond. The suggestion of a business judgement rule seems to go 
some way to striking that balance. 
 
Seeking Direction from Bondholders 
In addition to the problems surrounding acting without the direction of the 
bondholders, there are also issues which arrive having followed bondholder 
guidance. To an extent this issue has been dealt with through the Elektrim litigation93 
of 2004-2005 which concerned liability of trustees acting on the directions of 
bondholders.  
In the series of cases, there was a default on the bonds by the issuer 
(Elektrim) and some 70% of the bondholders voted to accelerate payment, the 
claimant being among them. The guarantor of the bonds was of the opinion that no 
default had occurred and made it clear that they would challenge the validity of any 
notice of acceleration issued by the Trustee (Law Debenture Trust Corp.). In other 
words, the trustee was faced with the dilemma of not acting and being in breach of 
the terms of the trust deed which said they must accelerate if required by 30% in 
value of the bondholders; and of acting on the wishes of the bondholders, thus being 
liable for a breach of terms should there turn out to be no event of default.  
The case went through to the House of Lords in which it was ruled that the 
trustee is obliged to act on the wishes of the bondholders in cases of acceleration, 
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but also that the trustee should not be held liable if the acceleration is invalid.  The 
court at first instance in this series also cleared up the question as to what should be 
classed as a default in a bond issue. A common phrase in the market is that a 
default occurs upon an event which is ‘materially prejudicial’ to the bondholders, and 
in his judgement Justice Smith reasoned that this does not simply concern the 
economic interests of the bonds i.e. payment of interest, but also rights ancillary to 
the economic interest.94 In this case, ancillary rights included the right to have a 
bondholder-appointed representative on the Elektrim board of directors. The rulings 
are said to be welcome news to bond trustees, bringing clarity to the situation 
surrounding acceleration, and arguably leaving trustees in a position to be erring 
slightly less on the side of caution when it comes to declaration of default.95 
 
The Integration of Sukuk 
In much of my evaluation so far, when it comes to applying existing stances and 
principles of bond issues to the sukuk, there has been an air of uncertainty. Despite 
the position of the U.K. as a global leader of sukuk outside of the Middle East and 
Asia, the structure is still in its infancy throughout the Western world, and so there is 
very little information to draw on when considering how they would fit in to our 
current system.  
Legislation has been passed to aid the development of a U.K. sukuk market,96 
and Islamic finance has the perception by some as being a more ethical form of 
borrowing, 97  though at this stage there are a number of barriers to complete 
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integration. Much is being done to appease these problems, 98  which include 
standardisation of Islamic principles, regulation, and tax.  One potential issue could 
be the role of exemption clauses in bonds and sukuk. It strikes me as a possible 
concern that in sukuk scenarios, even if the trustee responsibilities are delegated, 
the issuer is the trustee according to the trust deed. If the trustee has excluded 
liability, and the issuer is the trustee, then who can the certificate holders turn to in 
order to bring a claim in the case of a negligent trustee? 
Further to the above concerns, it is notable that it could be that the USP of 
Islamic finance is its greatest barrier to permeating the Western market. English and 
Welsh law is the governing law of choice for much of the business world. It is the 
global law of contract, and the leading choice for international business and dispute 
resolution.99 One of the reasons for the popularity of English law is that it is clear, 
flexible, and certain;100 these adjectives cannot so easily be used to describe an 
instrument or framework with morality and ethics at its core. 
 
Conclusion  
In summary, the al-ijara sukuk structure is in practice very similar to a conventional 
bond structure in its’ aims and how it goes about achieving them. Following from this, 
it is little surprise that the role of the trust and trustee in each structure is very similar. 
The trust form has been described as an ‘immensely powerful and flexible instrument 
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of modern finance’101 and this is displayed in how the tool has been fitted into both 
conventional bonds and a form of Islamic finance.  
This dissertation has shown that despite their similarities, there are still 
hindrances to complete integration of sukuk into the western financial legal system 
which arguably leaves the conventional bond as the more attractive option at 
present. However, the last half a decade has seen changes to legislation, unifying 
standards, and an example by government in the first U.K. sovereign sukuk, among 
other things, paving the way for full exploitation of this newly accessible pool of 
potential finance in the long term, and there are no signs that this process is slowing. 
In the next ten years, we can expect the large commercial law firms to hit headlines 
in this area with numerous innovations in order to match supply to demand for 
Islamic finance mechanisms. With capital markets growing increasingly globalised, 
the value and advantages of being able to tap this large reservoir of new finance will 
be fully realised. 
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